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The Scholars’ Initiative addresses the
need to break the cycle of nationalist
discourse that perpetuates divisions
between ethnic groups by (1) creating a
common narrative that discredits
proprietary myths, while validating
“inconvenient facts” that must be
acknowledged before mutual recognition
and reconciliation can begin, and
(2) enlisting regional media and political
leaders to acknowledge (and hopefully)
endorse) the existence of a common
account co-authored by their own
scholars.
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Two decades have now passed since the peoples of
central and Eastern Europe emerged from a half-century of
Communism. Like so many other countries around the
globe that have thrown off authoritarian regimes, they were
inspired by the prospect of moving straight from dictatorship
to democracy. These sanguine expectations were certainly
shared by many in the West. The fall of the Soviet Union
had been attended by great optimism that, after a century of
totalitarianism, war and genocide, the world would finally be
safe for democracy. Pundits like Dennis Fukuyama even
predicted that the post-Cold War generation had reached
the “end of history” insofar as the future would no longer
record the contentious competition between authoritarianism
and pluralism; instead, “history” would presumably consist of
little more than the unremarkable pursuit of knowledge,
wealth, and human happiness.
Instead, the “democratization” process was quickly
overshadowed by the acrimonious, and sometimes violent
dissolution of multiethnic societies throughout the formerly
Communist eastern half of Europe. Although the bloody
demise of Yugoslavia grabbed most of the headlines, the
independence of most other eastern bloc countries was
attended by tensions and bloody secession movements
across the Caucasus (i.e. Abkhazia, Chechnya, NagornoKarabakh, South Ossetia). Moreover, the same process has
played out elsewhere. Democratization in the Muslim World
– whether in Afghanistan and Iraq following U.S.
intervention, in post-Suharto Indonesia (i.e. Aceh, the
Moluccas, East Timor) or among the successor states of the
Arab Spring – has exposed deep rifts in multiethnic societies
that had appeared to non-experts as culturally monolithic.
Nor can we ignore the potential for ethnic conflict in
countries like Myanmar as they move toward pluralism.
Indeed, Western impatience with China’s ruling elite fails to
account for that country’s complex mosaic of cultural and
language groups that would quickly seek empowerment in
the aftermath of free elections.
A central feature in ethnic conflict is the parallel
existence of separate, competing national narratives that pit
the peoples of defunct empires against one another. This is
certainly the case across central Europe, where newly
created nation-states have crafted mutually exclusive,
proprietary historical accounts that justify their separate
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existence. Inevitably, each narrative employs a
different array of “truths”, many of which are either
distorted or blatantly untrue, while carefully
excising “inconvenient facts” that promote the utility
of multiethnic coexistence and justify the dissonant
narrative or political agenda of other national
groups. The resulting, divergent recitations of
history not only unite each new repu.0blic’s
constituent “state-forming” nationality, but also sow
mistrust, resentment and even hatred between
them and other peoples with whom they had
previously coexisted. In the former Yugoslavia
mutually exclusive national narratives have divided
the previously dominant Serbs against their former
wartime adversaries in Bosnia, Croatia, Slovenia
and Kosovo.

the criminal record of the Milošević regime; the
recent election of the neo-fascist Tomislav Nikolić
attests to the grip of myth and denial over the
Serbian people, the great majority of whom still
adore mass murderers currently being tried for
genocide at The Hague. Moreover, so long as
they retain a de facto monopoly over public
memory, perception, and interpretation, nationalist
politicians there and elsewhere will continue to
discredit and marginalize the few independent
voices that challenge them. Indeed, there exist
many among the region’s political, academic and
media elite who privately concede the corruption of
their vocal majority’s historical accounts, but who
nonetheless lack the courage to take a public
position.

Far from resolving these divisions, the
democratization process has accelerated and
intensified conflicts. It is virtually impossible for
politicians to confront and expose national myths
and inconvenient truths in an age of mass politics,
particularly in democratic societies where the
voting public has already internalized what it has
learned from previous generations, whether in
schoolbooks or across the kitchen table.
Notwithstanding the many positive attributes of
democracy and the almost universal faith that it
inspires as an instrument of societal justice and
stability, the greater accountability of popularly
elected leaders mortgages their ability to confront
and reconcile competing narratives that are firmly
entrenched in popular memory.

Research Findings

The international community has employed a
number of strategies for bridging the cognitive gap
between peoples. Western media platforms such
as Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and the
BBC have disseminated news and information,
while philanthropic NGOs like the Soros
Foundation’s Open Society Institute have
sponsored numerous confidence-building, “peopleto-people” programs. International tribunals have
painstakingly investigated, and then exposed
criminal acts committed by all sides in conflict
zones from Rwanda and West Africa to the former
Yugoslavia. Yet none of these vehicles has been
able to overcome the proprietary representations of
“patriotic” political leaders --- and the great majority
of “mainstream” media platforms that articulate the
prevailing national narrative. This is especially
evident today in Serbia, whose newly democratic
leaders and free media continue to ignore or deny

Over the past decade, an international
consortium of 300+ historians and social scientists
from 29 countries have researched, written and
published a common history of the Yugoslav
conflicts of the 1990s. In January 2009, Purdue
University Press and the U.S. Institute of Peace
jointly published Confronting the Yugoslav
Controversies: a Scholars’ Initiative, which
challenged the tendentious nationalistic narratives
that have succeeded so well in dividing the
peoples of central Europe, both exposing and
discrediting each belligerent’s myths about the
Yugoslav conflicts, while simultaneously inserting
indisputable, but inconvenient facts known to their
former adversaries. One year later a SerboCroatian edition appeared in Sarajevo. Its work is
embodied in the research of twelve multinational
research teams each of which was charged with
focusing on the most contentious issues that
impede mutual understanding between the Serbs
and their wartime adversaries across the newly
constructed territorial and cultural frontiers of
former Yugoslavia.
From the beginning, the Scholars’ Initiative (SI)
committed itself to three core principles that guided
all its activities: (1) an absolute insistence on
scholarly integrity and methodologies, (2) the
inclusivity of both sources and participants from all
“sides” in the Yugoslav conflicts, and (3) the
adoption of full transparency of the programmatic
use of electronic mail for transmission and for
review of every draft of the twelve team reports to
all project participants.
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Whereas the presentation of a common
narrative was itself revolutionary, the SI also broke
new ground by engaging with the public in each of
the Yugoslav successor states. From the outset, its
leadership worked closely both with regional
television, radio and print media in presenting its
findings and with civic and political leaders
(principally incumbent presidents, prime ministers
and foreign ministers), who were apprised of the
project’s progress and of the hope that they would
place a foot on the common platform that their own
scholars had helped build. Over the past three
years, political leaders in Bosnia, Croatia and
Kosovo (though not yet Serbia) have responded to
numerous news broadcasts throughout the region
by issuing public endorsements of the project and
its findings.
Recognizing the SI’s utility for
achieving a systemic solution to the region’s ethnic
divisions, the U.S. State Department also actively
supported the project by lobbying political leaders
on its behalf. Indeed, in the three years since the
publication of the initial English-language edition,
the SI has achieved each of six objectives that it
identified at the project’s outset to:

Salient Implications

1) forge lasting professional ties and dialogue
among scholars across the former Yugoslavia,
western Europe and North America
2) provide the first platform for assembling and
analyzing primary and secondary sources from
all sides of the Yugoslav conflicts in a single,
balanced and readily accessible account
3) publish new, original research that exposes
(some of) the myths and resolves (some of)
those controversies that have foreclosed
meaningful
transnational
communication
between scholars and mutual understanding
among peoples of the former Yugoslavia
4) impact the public consciousness of the ethnic
and national groups of former Yugoslavia
through public media
5) encourage political (and other opinion) leaders
to adopt positions in public discourse that share
or create common ground across the region’s
ethnic and national divides
6) create a model for transnational dialogue
among scholars elsewhere in central Europe.

Given the central role that hegemonic
narratives play in mobilizing and entrenching
nationalist forces in democratic societies, it is naive
to assume that frozen conflicts like Yugoslavia,
Cyprus, and Israel-Palestine can be resolved
anytime in the foreseeable future without
confronting their competing national narratives.
The same grim logic applies to the prospects for
easing international tensions between countries
that have been divided for generations by
incompatible renditions of the past. After all, nearly
a century has passed since the commission of the
Armenian Genocide without any acknowledgment
by generations of elected Turkish politicians; seven
decades after the rape of Nanjing and untold
“comfort
women”,
successive
Japanese
parliaments cannot acknowledge Chinese and
Korean narratives of their victimhood at the hands
of the Japanese Imperial Army; six decades after
the creation of Israel, its current government
continues to block efforts by Israeli and Palestinian
scholars to acknowledge common ground about
the events of 1948; nor will democratically elected
Indian and Pakistani governments ever be able to
reconcile their mutually exclusive renditions of the
sub-continent’s violent dissolution just one year
earlier.

In November the SI will publish a second edition
that will incorporate new evidence that has been
uncovered since 2009; a second Serbo-Croatian
edition will appear in Cyrillic script in 2013.

Given that the forces of Balkan nationalism
have been evolving for nearly two centuries, it
would be absurdly premature to proclaim any
lasting measure of success. Nonetheless, the SI’s
achievement in presenting a common narrative
offers a model for challenging the hegemony of
nationalist discourse in the newly emerging
democratic societies. Indeed, over the past year
(August 2011, July 2012), members of the British
Parliament’s All Party Parliamentary Group
(APPG) for Cyprus have hosted presentations by
SI Project Director Charles Ingrao and British
academic experts as it searches for a solution to
the 38-year deadlock in negotiations between the
former British colony’s Greek and Turkish
communities. The SI is already widely known to
policy makers at the U.S. State Department and to
Congressional staffers, particularly on the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. But this is just a
start to correcting an endemic problem that has
drained much of the Western world’s humanity
over the past century.
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Our continued failure to diagnose the cultural
malaise behind these frozen conflicts will
perpetuate the tensions that always complicate
and frequently paralyze international cooperation
on even the most mundane issues. That we have
been working around these problems for over a
half-century should not condemn us to
perpetuating them when a systemic solution is
within our reach. If we can derive solace from our
dysfunctionalism, it is that public education and
literacy in much of Asia and most of Africa have yet
to reach a stage where citizens can be mobilized
on a comparable scale. With an estimated eighty
percent of the world’s land borders cutting across
ethnic groups, there may be many more
Yugoslavias ahead of us.
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